Public service announcement

We interrupt transmission to bring you pictures of my hike today. The trail is the same, the distance the same but the exhaustion is different!

Euthanesia

We think talking about what god is, whether there are any gods and if they care about us, though sometimes interesting, there is nothing new we will say that will bring any gods to life.

We are going to look for data and debates on euthanasia. This will be our next topic of discussion.

To move the debate forward, I will declare where I stand on this debate. I support the procedure and look to a time when this will be available to everyone who requires such help.

We will try our best to look for interesting posts on this topic.

Quotable quotes- Truth

I have always said I will fight for any course I believe is right but avoid the death if I can. In the Wanderer and his Shadow, Nietzsche expresses the same sentiments more eloquently

Dying for the ‚Äútruth.”‚ÄĒ We should not let ourselves be burnt by our opinions: we are
not that sure of them. But perhaps for this: that we may have and change our opinions.

A man can dream

Socrates.‚ÄĒ If all goes well, the time will come when one will take up the¬†memorabilia of Socrates rather than the Bible as a guide to morals and reason… The¬†pathways of the most various philosophical modes of life lead back to him… Socrates¬†excels the founder of Christianity in being able to be serious cheerfully and in¬†possessing that wisdom full of roguishness that constitutes the finest state of the human¬†soul. And he also possessed the finer intellect.

Nietzsche in The Wanderer and his shadow

On free will and punishment

My position on free will is known to the readers of this blog. I am not saying anything new in this post. Here is a passage from Nietzsche that I hope to hear your comments on.

Have the adherents of the theory of free will the right to punish?‚ÄĒ People who judge¬†and punish as a profession try to establish in each case whether an ill-doer is at all¬†accountable for his deed, whether he was able to employ his intelligence, whether he¬†acted for reasons and not unconsciously or under compulsion. If he is punished, he is¬†
punished for having preferred the worse reasons to the better: which he must therefore have known. Where this knowledge is lacking a man is, according to the prevailing view, unfree and not responsible: except if his lack of knowledge, his ignorantia legis [ignorance of the law] for example, is a result of an intentional neglect to learn; in 
which case, when he failed to learn what he should have learned he had already preferred the worse reasons to the better and must now suffer the consequences of his bad choice. If, on the other hand, he did not see the better reasons, perhaps from dull-wittedness or weakness of mind, it is not usual to punish him: he lacked, one says, the 
capacity to choose, he acted as an animal would. For an offense to be punishable presupposes that its perpetrator intentionally acted contrary to the better dictates of his intelligence. But how can anyone intentionally be less intelligent than he has to be? Whence comes the decision when the scales are weighted with good and bad motives? 
Not from error, from blindness, not from an external nor from an internal compulsion?¬†(Consider, moreover, that every so-called ‚Äúexternal compulsion” is nothing more than¬†the internal compulsion of fear and pain.) Whence? one asks again and again. The¬†intelligence is not the cause, because it could not decide against the better reasons?¬†
And here one calls ‚Äúfree will” to one‚Äôs aid: it is pure willfulness which is supposed to¬†decide, as impulse is supposed to enter within which motive plays no part, in which¬†the deed, arising out of nothing, occurs as a miracle. It is this supposed willfulness, in¬†a case in which willfulness ought not to reign, which is punished: the rational¬†
intelligence, which knows law, prohibition and command, ought to have permitted no¬†choice, and to have had the effect of compulsion and a higher power. Thus the¬†offender is punished because he employs ‚Äúfree will,” that is to say, because he acted¬†without a reason where he ought to have acted in accordance with reasons. Why did¬†he do this? But it is precisely this question that can no longer even be asked: it was a¬†deed without a ‚Äúfor that reason,” without motive, without origin, something¬†purposeless and non-rational.‚ÄĒ But such a deed too ought, in accordance with the¬†
first condition of all punishability laid down above, not to be punished! It is not as if something had not been done here, something omitted, the intelligence had not been employed: for the omission is under all circumstances unintentional! and only the intentional omission to perform what the law commands counts as punishable. The 
offender certainly preferred the worse reasons to the better, but without reason or¬†intention: he certainly failed to employ his intelligence, but not for the purpose of not¬†employing it. The presupposition that for an offense to be punishable its perpetrator¬†must have intentionally acted contrary to his intelligence‚ÄĒit is precisely this¬†
presupposition which is annulled by the assumption of ‚Äúfree will.” You adherents of¬†the theory of ‚Äúfree will” have no right to punish, your own principles deny you that¬†right! But these are at bottom nothing but a very peculiar conceptual mythology; and¬†the hen that hatched it sat on her egg in a place far removed from reality.

The Wanderer and his shadow, F. Nietzsche